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Bonds and Brands: Foundations of
Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820–1830 

MARC FLANDREAU AND JUAN H. FLORES
How does sovereign debt emerge? In the early nineteenth century, intermediaries’ 
market power and prestige served to overcome information asymmetries. Relying 
on insights from finance theory, we argue that capitalists turned to intermediaries’ 
reputations to guide their investment strategies. Intermediaries could in turn 
commit or else they would lose market share. This sustained the development 
of sovereign debt. This new perspective is backed by archival evidence and 
empirical data, and it suggests why strong but undemocratic states could borrow. 
“A good name is worth more than a gem.” 
Yiddish proverb 
ow does sovereign debt emerge and become sustainable, when 
there are information asymmetries, when countries have reasons to 
renege on their commitments, when intermediaries have incentives to 
cheat investors? History provides an instance where this happened. In 
the early nineteenth century, at a time when information asymmetries 
were enormous, one Gregor MacGregor managed to sell to the public 
the securities of a fictitious state known as “Poyais.” A sovereign debt 
“bubble” developed. A number of the new bond issues failed miserably, 
but the episode did lay the ground for the emergence of a successful 
sovereign debt market. 
 By studying the experiment, this article provides a new perspective 
on the sustainability of sovereign debt and the reasons why states 
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honor their commitments. Our approach to the “sovereign debt 
puzzle” (i.e., why do countries repay their debts?) differs from previous 
explanations. We argue that market power helped overcome information 
asymmetries and sustained the development of sovereign debt. Given the 
dearth of information about sovereign borrowers, capitalists relied on 
intermediaries’ reputations to guide their investments. 
 The model we consider is the following: when borrowers accessed 
global capital markets through the agency of a “big name” underwriter, 
investors were prepared to pay a higher price. Leading banks thus owned 
a “brand” that could grant market access on favorable terms. Since they 
earned their income from their sustained ability to deliver safety to their 
customers, they had strong reasons to make a careful use of their 
reputation: a wrong choice would reverberate on market share and 
therefore, on profitability. In other words, the reason why borrowers’ 
credibility problems were not just translated to intermediaries is to be 
found in market power. 
 Conversely, because prestigious banks controlled access to liquidity, 
borrowers had incentives to refrain from defaulting, and this contributed 
to protect the credibility of intermediaries. Finally, because borrowers 
faced switching costs when shopping around, incumbent names 
managed to retain market predominance. The outcome was a highly 
hierarchical, highly concentrated, and highly persistent global bond 
market, which turned out to be sustained by its very monopolization. 
 This view represents a departure from current research in history, 
economics, and political science. In particular, we demonstrate the 
relevance of microeconomics and modern finance theory for the study 
of international financial organization. While recent works discuss the 
relation between sovereign debt and good governance (embedded in
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institutions such as constitutions, commitments, or the rule of law), we 
suggest looking at intermediaries’ market shares. Finally, while modern 
wisdom holds that globalization and the spread of information go 
hand in hand, we find that ignorance, or rather, the monopolization 
of knowledge, were decisive factors in the development of financial 
globalization in this early era. 
 To guide the reader through a substantial amount of historical 
and theoretical material, the argument in this article is organized as 
follows. We begin by surveying the recent literature on the history of 
sovereign debt. This will serve to outline the novelty of our emphasis on 
intermediaries’ reputation. We next introduce our theory and articulate 
its relation to modern finance literature. After providing readers with 
the necessary historical background, we test our theory by looking 
at the 1820s sovereign debt boom-bust cycle, and underwriters’ prestige 
in the 1820s. We then demonstrate how intermediaries’ prestige 
enabled investors to screen borrowers and argue that concerns over 
reputation aligned the incentives of bondholders and leading merchant 
bankers. After a statistical test of our argument, our conclusion offers 
suggestions for future research and emphasize that current views 
on the “democratic advantage” and constitutional constrain may be 
incomplete. 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT PUZZLE IN THEORY AND HISTORY 
 Sovereign lending involves two problems. Several lenders deal 
with one borrower, which creates difficulties with contracting and 
collective action. In addition, the immunity of the sovereign borrower 
only adds to the trouble. These problems are so severe that in an 
influential article, Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff have argued that 
sovereign lending is not feasible if financial markets are complete and 
perfectly competitive. Governments can borrow in one market, invest 
the proceeds in another, and default. 
 Subsequent research has relaxed some of the underlying assumptions 
behind these results. Bulow and Rogoff suggest that punishment may 
sustain sovereign debt.1 In that spirit, Kris Mitchener and Marc 
Weidenmier argue that before 1914, “supersanctions” (gunboats, trade 
sanctions, or external control) provided the credible threat that made 
sovereign debt possible. 
1 Bulow and Rogoff, “Sovereign Debt.” Another solution to the sustainability problem is 
monopoly power on the lender’s side. See Chowdry, “International Lending”; Wright, 
“Reputations”; and Flandreau, “Home Bias.” 
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 One problem with the gunboat argument is that although a 
substantial part of military interventions were conducted by the United 
States, London was actually the main market for sovereign debt. 
Earlier wisdom from D. C. M. Platt emphasized how reluctant British 
authorities were to wield political power in order to enforce payment 
of private debts.2 Subsequent British prime ministers saw the hazards 
of transforming the navy into a collection agency.3 Philip Ziegler writes 
about Prime Minister Canning, who rejected intervention in defaulting 
Latin American countries during the period this article considers, that 
“not only would he not send a gunboat to manifest British displeasure, 
he declined to allow British diplomats and consular agents to bring 
pressure on the defaulters. If British investors chose to risk their money 
overseas, then it was their own funeral if they lost it.”4
 Funerals provide opportunities to congregate, and another theme 
in the sovereign debt literature is how creditors coordinate their actions. 
Edwin Borchard has discussed the framework for creditors’ action, 
and William Wynne has provided case studies. There is much recent 
focus on the experience of the London based Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (or CFB), created 1868. Barry Eichengreen and Richard 
Portes study bonds issued during the 1920s and show that organized 
British bondholders realized higher ex post rates of return than their 
unorganized American counterparts. Paolo Mauro, Nathan Sussman 
and Yishay Yafeh conclude from CFB reports that “the CFB may have 
had an easier time than any comparable body would have today.” 
Rui Esteves argues that over the period 1870–1914, CFB sponsored 
settlements outperformed other arrangements in terms of duration and 
recovery ratios.5
 A third group of papers dealing with sovereign debt follow up on 
Douglass North and Barry Weingast’s claim that parliamentary control 
2 Mitchener and Weidenmier, “Corollary” and “Supersanctions”; Platt, Finance, pp. 34–53; 
and Lipson, “Security.” 
3 More recently, Tomz, Cooperation, p. 153, has argued that the correlation between default 
and military intervention is spurious because “defaulters tended to be involved in other disputes 
(civil wars, territorial conflicts, tort claims) that attracted the attention of major powers.”  
4 Ziegler, Sixth Great Power, pp. 107–08. Regarding trade sanctions, we find that Latin 
America was too attractive a market for merchant bankers to support sanctions in parliament. 
“The South American market presented by far greater advantage to the British merchant than 
any other be at present had intercourse with.” The Times, 21 May 1830. For an interesting 
argument linking monopoly in trade finance and repayment enforcement, see Vizcarra, 
“Guano.”
5 Borchard, Insolvency, vol. I; Wynne, Insolvency, vol. 2; Eichengreen and Portes, “Settling 
Defaults” and “After the Deluge”; Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh, Emerging Markets, p. 162; and 
Esteves, “Quis custodiet?” 
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provides opponents to default with a veto point.6 In an early-nineteenth- 
century variant, Niall Ferguson suggests that during the 1810s and 
1820s, the House of Rothschild favored borrowers with democratic 
restraint, an argument previously made by Karl Polanyi.7 In 1818 Nathan 
de Rothschild wanted to make a loan to Prussia conditional upon 
introduction of a form of parliamentary control. But archival evidence 
shows that in the end, the actual security was a mere mortgage on royal 
domains.8 Other historians have claimed that borrowing in London 
enabled Prussian policymakers to escape the constitutional concessions 
that a domestic loan would have forced.9
 We remark that during the period under study, many faithful and 
successful sovereign borrowers were in fact countries that lacked 
constitutional checks: reactionary or autocratic Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia, as well as their political satellites such as the Kingdom of 
Naples. Another successful borrower, Brazil, was a monarchy with less 
than perfect parliamentary control.10 While there were other countries 
such as Denmark and France that in the 1820s might have fit North 
and Weingast’s story about sovereign borrowing, their constitutional 
argument does not work for most countries. 
 A last family of studies emphasizes imperfect information. When 
investors cannot observe the true characteristics of borrowers, they only 
lend if certain observable policies or rules are implemented. Michael 
Bordo and Hugh Rockoff portray the gold standard exchange rate regime 
as a “good housekeeping seal of approval.” Michael Tomz claims that 
lenders learn about countries by observing their commitment to repay.11
Both emphasize the importance of contextual inference: adhering to the 
rules in dire times earns more reputation than doing it in easy periods. 
6 North and Weingast, “Constitutions.” Supporters include Root, “Ancien Régime”; and 
Schultz and Weingast, “Democratic Advantage,” for Ancien Régime France, Razaghian, 
“Credibility,” for early-nineteenth-century United States, and Summerhill, “Sovereign 
Commitment,” for nineteenth-century Brazil (between 1824 and 1889). Sussman and Yafeh, 
“Meiji,” provide a contrarian view. Stasavage, Public Debt and “Partisan Politics,” emphasizes 
the role of partisan politics as opposed to constitutions. 
7 Polanyi, Great Transformation; and Ferguson, World’s Banker, pp. 131–43. Sylla, “Credit 
Rating,” p. 21, provides a similar interpretation. 
8 Ferguson, World’s Banker, p. 132. Ferguson makes a similar claim about a Portuguese loan, 
which would have “once again demonstrated [Nathan’s] willingness to lend to a constitutional 
regime, as the Portuguese king had accepted a Spanish-style constitution drafted by the Lisbon 
Cortes on his return from Brazil in 1822” (p. 142). As we will see, however, this loan was not
brought out by the House of Rothschild. 
9 Rothschild Archive, 000/401. According to Gille, Rothschild, vol. I, p. 202, Frankfurt’s 
burgomaster Smidt noted in 1820: “Prussia would have had to give up its regime long ago if the 
house [of Rothschild] had not helped it to survive. See also Kehr, “Preussichen Bürokratie.” 
10 Summerhill, “Sovereign Commitment.”  
11 Bordo and Rockoff, “Gold Standard”; and Tomz, Cooperation.
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 However, during the period under study, the gold standard existed 
only in Britain—and as a recent reintroduction. Other countries had 
paper, silver, or bimetallic standards.12 The value of an exchange rate 
regime as a signal of good faith also suffers from a free riding problem: 
nobody “owns” a convertibility rule, and countries that pretend they 
behave well merely by adhering to convertibility debase the rule. 
 Another assumption that is implicit in Bordo and Rockoff and 
explicit in Tomz is that the set of investors is made of more or less 
helpless, atomistic, identical individuals who cannot see beyond the veil 
of policy rules.13 But Marc Flandreau and Frédéric Zumer have shown 
that late-nineteenth-century investors were sophisticated. They priced 
bonds to reflect fundamentals. Flandreau’s study of the emergence of 
rating techniques in the 1890s also suggests that investors were not at 
all “atomistic agents” because of the role of certain intermediaries, such 
as Crédit Lyonnais in France, in the process of information gathering 
and processing.14 But what de we know of the early nineteenth century? 
A SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT 
 This article argues that sovereign borrowers could access markets 
because financial intermediaries could monitor them effectively, and the 
reason why intermediaries would monitor them effectively is because 
the intermediaries themselves were not an amorphous lot.  
 To begin with, there were higher rank underwriters, who had 
the ability to signal good loans to uninformed investors. They could 
credibly commit to monitoring borrowers, because they were concerned 
with retaining their reputation. They could also prevent countries from 
borrowing too much, by suspending market access. Conversely, they 
could provide attractive borrowing terms to countries that behaved 
well. Borrowers could thus credibly commit to repay their debts, for 
if they did not behave, they would have to rely on less prestigious 
intermediaries, who could not offer comparable loan terms. Therefore, 
our story is about imperfect competition, information asymmetries, and 
market structure.  
 So let us begin by exploring the various mechanisms through which 
banks became “associated” with certain countries through the process 
of public offering. Based on our reading of secondary sources and 
12 On bimetallism, see Flandreau, Glitter of Gold.
13 Tomz, Cooperation, p. 233; Mosley, Global Capital, p. 258; and Mauro, Sussman, and 
Yafeh, Emerging Markets, p. 99. Cassis, “Financial Institution,” underlines the importance of 
English investment trusts for foreign and colonial finance.  
14 Flandreau and Zumer, Global Finance; and Flandreau, “Caveat.”  
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numerous original sovereign debt contracts in merchant bank archives, 
we have formed a picture of “typical” international sovereign bond 
issues in Europe in the early nineteenth century.15 First, the relevant 
authority (“the government”) had to decide to raise fresh capital. The 
impetus to do so may have come from bankers. The government then 
had to choose the characteristics of the securities (maturity of the bonds, 
coupon, etc.), as well as select a method for picking an intermediary or 
agent (“the underwriter”). That agent could be one or several syndicated 
banks and venture capitalists who were prepared to bear the risks 
of buying the bonds from the issuer and selling them to the public.16
The degree of cooperation among lenders (“syndication”) was not as 
formalized then as it would become later. 
 Two main adjudication systems emerged. The first was a sealed 
bid auction where a number of selected syndicates were invited to 
submit formal tenders in closed envelopes. The other method we call 
an “open bargaining” system. A number of bankers were informally 
invited to participate or sometimes invited themselves. Tenders were 
communicated to the government, and counteroffers were made. 
Competitors occasionally merged, or split. The winning group was 
eventually chosen.17 A critical difference between the two systems was 
the degree of control regarding the identity of the winner. If borrowers 
had a preferred intermediary but wanted to extract the highest price, 
authorities might prefer open bargaining. On the other hand, open 
bargaining enabled bidders to observe each others’ actions and may 
have led to more conservative offers. 
 The previous stage was “contracting.” Next was “distributing.” 
Selling securities to investors required facilities, the employment of 
clerks, and the transfer of funds. A bank (or possibly group of banks 
if the issue occurred on several markets) was chosen to serve as the 
window. Bonds were paid in installments, and installments were spread 
over weeks or months. Only after investors settled the last installment 
did governments receive the cash. But underwriting contracts could 
anticipate deliveries, with bankers assuming the risk. Finally, someone 
had to take care of coupon payments, which involved managing 
transfers from the borrowers to the creditors. The risks and revenues of 
15 Secondary sources include Jenks, Migration; Gille, Rothschild, vols. I and II; and Suzuki, 
Loan Issues. Dawson, First Debt Crisis; and Costeloe, Bonds, provide perspectives on the early 
period.
16 The separation of stages suggested here is heuristic. Bidders competed on borrowing terms 
and on the pattern of underwriting contracts simultaneously. “Bond characteristics selection” 
and “auction” stages overlapped.  
17 We believe that reasons for choosing alternative auctioning methods should be a topic for 
future research. 
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the last two operations were much smaller than those from the first, but 
leads and lags could cause trouble. 
 All these tasks need not be performed by a single institution, but if 
one did, the signal to the market was that the bank sponsored the issue. 
This responsibility appears to have been meaningful, since there were 
cases where distributing banks emphasized to the public that they 
had only a partial association with a given issue. In other cases, banks 
could participate in the underwriting of a given security but kept their 
involvement secret.  
 In practice, two main forms of cooperation between bankers and 
governments were observed. At one extreme, one intermediary did it 
all and served as contractor, window, and coupon payer. We will call 
such a bank a “sponsor.” At the other extreme, the bank acted as simple 
window and coupon payer. We will call such a bank an “issuer.” 
 Consider now an ideal world where information is perfect and 
markets competitive. Governments sell bonds to atomistic investors. 
To make matters simple, they sell sterling denominated 5 percent 
perpetual securities. These securities are distributed through banks. 
Everybody knows how good borrowers are. Differences in bond prices 
reflect known default risks. Securities are sold at their known 
equilibrium value, minus the intermediary’s fee. The fee is charged 
competitively and equal to the marginal costs of distribution. In this 
case, intermediaries are essentially ATM machines. 
 However, the world was not at all like that and as a result, 
intermediaries had a critical role to play. Recall the case of MacGregor, 
who sold the bonds of a country that did not exist (Poyais). In real life, 
there were governments that knew how good or bad they were, but if 
they were bad, they had reasons to claim they were good. And there 
were intermediaries who had some information about borrowers (if 
nothing else, they had an idea of how much information was available). 
But they earned fees from selling securities: like governments, they had 
incentives to claim that bad issuers were really good ones—or even that 
they existed when they did not as did the infamous MacGregor.  
 This opens the door to strategic behavior by both borrowers and 
intermediaries. One way to explore this is to observe how fees are 
being charged. However, current archival limitations do not enable us 
to study them. Fortunately, there is another way to approach the 
problem. Modern finance literature recognizes that issuers and 
underwriters of corporate securities deliberately underprice their issues. 
This underpricing is known as the Initial Public Offering discount, but 
is not limited to genuine IPOs. More broadly, researchers have 
identified the existence of a “price run-up” after an issue occurs. They 
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have also suggested that price run-ups shed light on underlying 
information asymmetries. 
 Recent research on IPO discounts and price run-ups in corporate 
debt markets interprets the underpricing phenomenon as a “lemon’s 
premium,” which has to be given to investors for the issue to 
succeed.18 In a world where there are both informed and uninformed 
agents, underpricing compensates uninformed investors for the risks of 
trading against superior information. In these models, the extent of 
underpricing increases as the information asymmetry between informed 
and uninformed agents widens.19
 In principle, therefore, prestigious underwriters would be able to 
secure lower price run-ups because they could reduce information 
asymmetries. Following the same logic, information asymmetries for 
bonds issued by bad banks are large and the discount should, in 
principle, be big. However, competition is important here. When there 
are many prestigious houses, competition does indeed ensure that issue 
prices remain close to the secondary market prices. But if the 
prestigious underwriter is a monopoly firm, it can extract a rent for the 
service of labelling debt issues. Meanwhile, free entry opens the door to 
mediocrity. Informed speculators are attracted by the volatility of bad 
issues. They move in, reducing the IPO discount (this is known as the 
“hot issue” problem).20 With one prestigious firm and free entry for 
mediocre underwriters, one would expect a separating equilibrium to 
emerge, with stable, low yield, high run-up, serious issues, underwritten 
by the prestigious house on the one hand, and riskier, higher yield, 
volatile and low average run-ups issues underwritten by anybody else 
on the other.21
 How then do investment banks secure a good reputation? Thomas 
Chemmamur and Paolo Fulghieri develop a relevant model in which 
financial intermediaries’ reputation for veracity mitigates the moral 
hazard problem in information production. Prestigious underwriters 
who might be tempted to overprice in order to generate short-term gains 
do not do so because it would damage their reputation. Over the long
18 Rock, “New Issues”; Ritter, “Going Public”; and Allen and Faulhaber, “Signalling.” 
19 Carter and Manaster, “Initial Public Offerings”; and Chemmamur, “Pricing.” 
20 In the historical context of this study, initial subscription of securities only required a down 
payment of about 10 percent of the value of the bond, after which the purchasing certificate or 
“scrip” could be traded, so that “scrip” was an option and invited speculators. 
21 Ritter, “‘Hot Issues’,” makes this claim in a model of speculative manias, where there is 
segmentation between the market for “hot” and “cold” issues. Prestigious underwriters abstain 
from the market for “hot” issues, while lesser ones compete for them. As a result, there is less 
underpricing in the market for hot issues. 
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run, Richard Carter, Frederick Dark, and Ajai Singh show that issues 
managed by prestigious houses outperform those managed by ordinary 
ones.22
 Previous historians have noted the existence of such a discount in 
nineteenth-century sovereign bond markets and suggested that setting of 
the discount was a critical part of the business of underwriting. In what 
follows, we use the insights from financial economics to interpret the 
evidence we have on primary market pricing.23
 Our argument has parallels in earlier research, including our 
own work.24 Gary Gorton, for instance, has invoked insights from 
Douglas Diamond’s incomplete information model to suggest that 
intermediaries’ reputation formation may have deterred American banks 
from becoming “wildcats” (i.e., issue banknotes and vanish in the open 
air afterwards) in the free banking era.25 The mechanism rests on a 
mixture of repeat play and monopoly power. A bank with a large 
market share behaves responsibly, because the one shot gains of 
cheating are offset by future losses in market share. Business historians 
have emphasized the role of prestige, competition, reputation, and 
strategic selection of customers.26 Another parallel exists with the U.S. 
corporate financial history, where Bradford DeLong has emphasized the 
role of J. P. Morgan’s “adding value” to U.S. firms on whose boards his 
representatives sat.27 Later on, Morgan and other New York bankers 
22 Chemmamur and Fulghieri, “Reputation.” An early contribution is Hayes, “Investment 
Banking.” Beatty and Ritter, “Reputation,” show that underwriters whose offerings 
underperform lose market share. 
23 There is anecdotal historical evidence on sovereign IPO underpricing in Gille, Rothschild, 
vol. I. Relevant references in financial economics include Logue, “Pricing”; Ibbotson, “New 
Issues”; and Miller and Reilly, “Mispricing,” who discuss the “IPO puzzle” for corporate 
securities.
24 Flandreau, “Moral Hazard,” notes the incidence of relationship banking on sovereign debt 
crisis management, and Flandreau, “Caveat,” argues that Crédit Lyonnais’ rating techniques 
were developed in the 1890s to raise the bank’s profile and take advantage of the damage the 
Argentine crisis did to Barings in 1890. Flores, Le leader, “Lombard Street,” and “Baring 
Crisis,” emphasizes the importance of the flawed signal that Barings sent to the market by 
distributing Argentine securities. 
25 Gorton, “Reputation Formation”; and Diamond, “Reputation Acquisition.” On wildcat 
banking in the United States, see Dwyer, “Wildcat Banking.” 
26 Ziegler, Sixth Great Power, p. 107, argues: “If a loan backed by Barings’ ended in such 
abject failure, who would trust their judgment in the future?” A similar point is made by 
Carosso, Morgans, who argues that in the late nineteenth century, when J. P. Morgan became an 
“up and coming” house in international bond issues, concerns over reputation was a primary 
reason why they turned down certain accounts. On reputation, see also Jenks, Migration,
passim; Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp. 39–40; Suzuki, Loan Issues; Mosley, Global Capital,
pp. 258–63; and Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, Surviving.
27 DeLong, “J. P. Morgan’s Men.” In the mechanism DeLong emphasizes, Morgan associates 
would ensure that proper management decisions would be taken, but he also emphasizes 
reputational concerns and market share. 
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would get involved in sovereign debt, although marginally only until 
the interwar.28 In a similar vein, Ilse Mintz quotes contemporary reports 
that in New York in the 1920s, “bonds were bought by Tom, Dick, and 
Harry . . . without reference to the solidity or the solvency of the bonds 
. . ., but entirely on the faith of the house issuing them in New York.”29
Closer to our period, James Riley’s account of the late-eighteenth-
century Amsterdam market for sovereign debt raises similar issues. 
Since information was scarce, investors did not screen borrowers but 
instead looked at intermediaries.30 Evidence from 1790 indicates that 
investors distinguished among the intermediaries on the basis of the 
confidence they inspired, which arose from the “care which those 
houses take to only introduce in the market solid loans, and to monitor 
the respect of all forms.”31 Thus, we strongly suspect that the principles 
we are about to spell out have validity beyond the specific period we are 
looking at. 
THE FIRST FOREIGN DEBT BOOM AND BUST: 1820–1826 
 During the eighteenth century, a foreign exchange network 
consolidated around Amsterdam, where the embryo of a sovereign 
debt market developed.32 Following the French wars, London 
supplanted Amsterdam as the center of a highly integrated European 
system. Other important regional or national centers included Paris, 
Hamburg, Frankfort, Vienna, Milan, Madrid, Cadiz, and Naples. Cross 
listing of securities and partnership between correspondents facilitated 
arbitrage operation.33
 After 1815 sovereign debt markets were initially stirred by indemnity 
loans and war debt settlements among former allies.34 Figure 1 
shows international issues accelerating after 1820. Editions of 
Fortune’s Epitome, a leading market handbook, show only one 
non-British sovereign security outstanding in London in 1820, but 23 in 
28 Lewis, America’s Stake.
29 Mintz, Deterioration, p. 81. See also Lewis, America’s Stake, p. 382; and Winkler, 
Autopsy, p. 89. 
30 “First and foremost was the reputation that a firm acquired only after several years of 
prudent enterprise in which even the suggestion of rash business was absent. A house also had 
to meet standards concerning the scale of its activities . . . Investors also preferred firms meeting 
these and other standards.” Riley, Amsterdam, p. 39. 
31 Ibid., pp. 42–43. The insider was T. Cazenove, a prominent London broker.  
32 Ibid; and Dawson, First Debt Crisis, p. 15. 
33 Buist, At Spes; Gille, Rothschild, vol. I, pp. 79–80; and Neal, Rise.
34 These took the form of short-term lending, with banks holding sovereign debt in their 
books and stabilization loans to European governments. See Gille, Rothschild, vol. I.
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FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS’ STOCKS TRADED IN LONDON 
(Ex USA), 1818–1830
Source: Authors computations from subsequent editions of Fortune’s Epitome; and Wetenhall, 
Course of Exchange. The Fortune observation from 1830 is from the 1833 edition. 
1826.35 Similarly, James Wetenhall’s Course of the Exchange has 
quotes for foreign government securities rising from almost nil in 1820 
to 35 in 1825.36 This sovereign debt boom of the 1820s has sometimes 
been called the first “Latin American” debt crisis, but governments 
outside Latin America were involved as well. 
 Colombia’s 6 percent loan started things off.37 The same year saw 
loans to Chile, to Peru, to the imaginary “Poyais,” as well as to Spain, 
Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and the Kingdom of Naples. In the fall of 
1822, political complications in Spain rocked prices (Figure 2), but 
they subsided when the Congress of Verona gave France a mandate to
35 We restrict our attention to non-British sovereign bonds issued through London IPOs. This 
excludes French 5 percent rentes, and U.S. 3 percent and U.S. 6 percent, that came to London 
through cross listing. See Fortune’s Epitome, 1820. 
36 Quotations abroad reflected this trend. The Paris Cours des effets commerçables had one 
foreign security listed in 1820, but twelve in 1825. 
37 It was issued at the price of 84 (yielding 7.14 percent) and entirely sold (Dawson, First
Debt Crisis). On Colombian prospectuses, see Rothschild Archives, Box: XIII/230/78-95. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830
Total Fortune
Wetenhall: LatAm Quoted
Wetenhall: LatAm Listed
Wetenhall: Foreign Listed
Wetenhall: Foreign Quoted 
(Ex USA)
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050709001089
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:54:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
658 Flandreau and Flores
FIGURE 2
BOND PRICES DURING THE 1820–1826 BOOM-BUST CYCLE 
Note: Prices have been normalized to 5 percent coupon. 
Source: Wetenhall, Course of Exchange.
intervene.38 The constitutional Cortes government issued a final loan in 
1823, but when the absolute monarchy was restored, the king refused to 
recognize “odious” Cortes debts. Later the same year, there were two 
more loans, to Austria and Portugal, and then in 1824, Buenos Aires, 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Greece, and the Kingdom of Naples 
borrowed, followed by Brazil, Mexico, Greece, Denmark, and 
Guatemala in 1825. 
 In July 1825 “foreign funds” (as the equities issued by foreign 
governments were known in London) began to slide. In December 
1825, the collapse became part of a financial storm known as “the 
Panic.” It reached its apex on December 11th, when a run on London 
banks led to numerous failures. The Bank of England came close to 
suspend specie payments, and Latin American and South European 
securities plummeted (Figure 2). The collapse reverberated on financial 
intermediaries, some of whom had underwritten large amounts of 
sovereign debt such as Goldschmidt (which went under in February 
38 Held in October 1822, it was the last of the series of international get-togethers initiated by 
the Congress of Vienna. It met to consider action against the liberal government in Spain, see 
Nicolle, “Ouvrard.” 
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1826) and Barclay, Herring, Richardson and Co. (which crumbled in 
July).39
 Meanwhile, sovereign defaults were spreading. Peru was first to 
suspend payment, in April 1826, followed by Colombia in May. 
More defaults accumulated within the next two years: Chile, Greece, 
Mexico, Guatemala, Buenos Aires, and Portugal. By the end of 1829, 
the sovereign debt issues of the early 1820s had turned into a disaster.  
All the Latin American countries, except Brazil, and all Southern 
European countries, except the Kingdom of Naples, were in arrears. 
 Three elements are worth emphasizing. First, the sovereign defaults 
did not precede but rather followed the intermediaries’ failures. Second, 
there were substantial co-movements between certain bond prices. 
Third, not all securities were hit to the same extent: Prussia, Austria, 
Russia, the Kingdom of Naples, and, to some extent, Brazil fared 
relatively well and managed to escape the effects of this “southern 
states” debt crisis. 
 Earlier research discussed the crisis of 1825 from various vantage 
points. Bertrand Gille and Larry Neal provide general accounts. Frank 
Dawson gives an exhaustive perspective on Latin American debts. 
These and other studies discuss the reasons for the initial enthusiasm 
and eventual collapse, relying on contemporary opinions.40 The usual 
suspects include investors’ appetite for risk, which ran up against 
reality; excess liquidity, which was tripped up by restrictive monetary 
policy by the Bank of England; or connected lending (contractors of 
the Latin American bonds being sometimes promoters of mining 
companies), which foundered beneath unsustainable debt burdens.41
Bailout expectations (Britain had sponsored independence in Latin 
America and recognized the new republics in October 1822) ran 
head into Lord Canning’s insistence that Britain’s foreign policy was 
39 The collapse in sovereign debt had left Goldschmidt with a £0.4 million shortfall, or 30 
percent of the bank’s total liabilities. According to Gille, Rothschild, vol.  I, p. 159, Nathan 
Rothschild would have offered support to B. A. Goldschmidt, but the day after, he died, “of 
chagrin.” The trustees appointed to deal with the situation included several merchant bankers 
and financiers including Rothschild and Barclay and Gurney, and Mr. Richardson, See 
Guardian, Thursday, February 23. For Barclay, Herring, Richardson and Co., see Gille, 
Rothschild, vol.  I, pp. 159–160 and 162; and Costeloe, Bonds, p. 22. 
40 Gille, Rothschild, vol. I; Neal, “Financial Crisis”; and Dawson, First Debt Crisis. Other 
sources include Marichal, Century; and Costeloe, Bonds.
41 Ferns, Britain and Argentina; Jenks, Migration; and Platt, “Foreign Finance.” Doubleday, 
Financial History; and Neal, “Financial Crisis.” Chateaubriand, quoted by Gille (Rothschild, 
vol.  I, p. 110) blamed irrational exuberance. Ouvrard, a French banker, (also quoted by Gille, 
ibid., p. 156) blamed specie exports of numéraire to the New World that caused monetary 
contraction. 
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not subservient to the bondholders.42 And R. Fulford, for his part, 
blames the “volatile and unaccountable nature of man.”43
In this article, we emphasize the relevance of information asymmetries. 
We already mentioned the Poyais loan. Other swindles included loans 
issued with the complicity of the borrowing countries’ ministers in 
London who “forgot” to secure approval of the respective governments.44
The press was also corrupt with sellers of securities paying journalists for 
favorable coverage.45 But even the rare dependable sources did not 
provide much information. The two leading London stock market 
compendia, Thomas Mortimer’s Every Man his Broker and Thomas 
Fortune’s Epitome of the Stocks and Public Funds (known as Fortune’s
Epitome), did report in detail about British stocks. But for the more exotic 
instruments such as foreign bonds the content was shockingly thin.46
Figure 3 shows the Chilean, Neapolitan and Portuguese sections of Every 
Man. Only in the case of the Kingdom of Naples are we treated with an 
estimate of a somewhat vague “total debt.” Judging from the direct 
evidence that investors had on borrowers’ positions, one would conclude 
that investors could not tell how governments were doing.47 But as Figure 
3 shows, the name of the underwriter was included. The rest of this 
article will demonstrate that this was equivalent to a rating, because 
prestigious names were an encouragement to buy. 
INTERMEDIARIES’ PRESTIGE IN THE 1820S: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 “Prestige” and “reputation” in underwriting are notoriously difficult 
to measure. R. B. Carter and S. Manaster rely on the “starring order” on 
stock offering “tombstone” announcements that are published in the
42 Doubleday, Financial History; Gille, Rothschild, vol.  I; Ziegler, Sixth Great Power; and 
Dawson, First Debt Crisis, p. 35. An intriguing paper by Giorgio Fodor challenges the notion of 
a “bubble.” The crash, he argues, was not preceded with a genuine boom, for many securities 
never found a market. His account suggests (although he does not use that language) that Latin 
American debts were a lemon market that never really became a bubble. 
43 Fulford, Glyn’s, p. 108. 
44 Jenks, Migration; Dawson, First Crisis; Mathew, “First Anglo-Peruvian Debt”; and Fodor 
“Boom.”
45 In 1826, in the midst of the crisis, the young Benjamin Disraeli was hired to argue against 
the existence of a price collapse. Buckle and Monnypenny, Disraeli, chap. 5; and Fodor 
“Boom.”
46 See Flandreau, “Caveat,” for a discussion of how much information would be available to 
later investors. 
47 Compare this with the late situation described in Flandreau, “Caveat”; and Flores, 
“Information Asymmetries.” 
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050709001089
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:54:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Bonds and Brands 661 
FIGURE 3
DEBTS OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES, PORTUGAL, AND CHILE, FROM CAREY 
(1825) 
Source: Carey, Every Man, 1825, clippings from pp. 120, 125, 126, and 127. 
press after issues have taken place.48 There were no “tombstone” 
announcements in the early nineteenth century, but an analogue may be 
contemporaries’ opinion, as captured verbally in contemporary quotes, 
albeit “without reference to any comparative data.”49 At least verbal 
evidence is unanimous, making things easier. Around 1820 there were 
two “market leaders: Rothschilds and Barings”.50 In 1815 Barings were 
seen as the incumbent, but between 1815 and 1820 the Rothschilds 
became the market leader in sovereign debt.51 By 1830 statements  
by market participants recognized the Rothschilds’ ascendancy and 
surpassing of the Barings.52 There is also agreement regarding the lower 
48 Carter and Manaster, “Initial Public Offerings.” See also Logue, “Pricing”; Beatty and 
Ritter, “Reputation”; and Carter, Dark, and Singh, “Underwriter Reputation.” 
49 Chapman, Merchant Banking, p. 17. 
50 Ibid., pp. 16–38 
51 Ziegler, Sixth Great Power; and Gille, Rothschild, vol.  I, pp. 57–77. 
52 See contemporaries’ quotes in Gille, Rothschild, vol.  I, pp. 84, 88, 105, etc. On Baring’s 
relative decline, see Ziegler, Sixth Great Power, p. 97; and Hidy, Baring, p. 64. On its initial 
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TABLE 1
EARLY-NINETEENTH-CENTURY GOVERNMENT BONDS LEAGUE TABLES 
Rothschilds
Number of Issues Amounts 
 Flandreau and 
Flores Chapman 
Flandreau and
Flores Chapman 
1815–1837 9 24 29.8 105.5 
1839–1859 5 16 13.1 106.8 
Barings
Number of Issues Amounts 
 Flandreau and 
Flores Chapman 
Flandreau and
Flores Chapman 
1815–1837 3 5 10.0 43.2 
1839–1859 3 8 7.8 20.8 
 Others 
Number of Issues Amounts 
Flandreau and 
Flores
Flandreau and 
Flores
1815–1837 24 42.4 
1839–1859 13 30.6 
Source: Authors’ database and Chapman, Merchant Banking, pp. 16–38. 
rank of ordinary, yet nonetheless serious merchant banking firms, such 
as Wilson and Co., Frederick Huth and Co., Hullett Brothers and Co., 
Barclay, Herring, Richardson and Co., Lizardi and Co., and Reid, Irving 
and Co.53
 W. Megginson and K. Weiss use relative market share of the 
underwriters as a measure of reputation.54 Table 1 provides information 
on the number and amount of sovereign issues underwritten or sold by 
Rothschilds, Barings, and other banks from a variety of secondary 
sources.55 We also report the numbers derived from work by Stanley 
Chapman. Chapman relies on Fenn’s Compendium (editions of 1837 
and 1857), which gives details for most loans traded in London, 
whereas we focus on loans issued there. Chapman also includes railway 
bonds and a few sub-sovereign issues with sovereign guarantees. We 
lead through relation to the House of Hope, the Amsterdam powerhouse, see Buist, At Spes, p. 
524; Hidy, Baring, p. 53; and Gille, Rothschild, vol.  I, p. 103. 
53 Hidy, Baring, calls them “second rank” institutions. 
54 Megginson and Weiss, “Venture Capitalists Certification.” 
55 Authors’ database, which uses Fenn’s Compendia (1837 and 1857), Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders Reports (various editions), and individual bank archives. 
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have tried to stick to the narrow definition of sovereign debt. Finally, 
Chapman does not deal with intermediaries other than the Rothschilds 
and the Barings. Nevertheless, the two pictures are not inconsistent. 
Both our data and Chapman’s does suggest that Rothschilds dominated 
Barings. In addition, Table 1 shows the Barings’ and the Rothschilds’ 
dominance of sovereign debt. Taken together, the two firms furnished 
50 percent of the market for emerging market debt during the period 
1815–1837, and 40 percent during the period 1839–1859. 
 A third possible criterion of banks’ prestige is their capital. Modern 
models of industrial organization emphasize the strategic role of sunk 
costs and their interaction with market shares.56 Sunk costs may be 
used by early entrants to deter latecomers, and contribute to market 
leadership. Capital may be seen as a sunk cost, which provides 
incentives for careful decisions since banks stand to lose more if they 
make mistakes.57 Once again, the Rothschilds were exceptional, as 
Table 2 shows. In the 1820s they had a lump-sum capital of £4.37 
million and towered over their neighbors. The figure was ten times that 
of the runner-up—the Barings. The London Rothschilds alone were 
over twice as large as Barings (about £0.5 million in the 1820s).58 The 
Barings bank, on the other hand, was well ahead of the lesser houses, 
which typically had capital under £0.3 million. 
GOOD BANKS DO WHAT THEY WANT, BAD BANKS DO WHAT 
THEY CAN 
Banks and the Performance of Sovereign Debt Issues 
 Based on previous discussions, we expect securities underwritten by 
prestigious banks to outperform others. Table 3 summarizes relevant 
information on emerging markets securities issued in London after 
1815. The list was established on the basis of material provided in the 
1820s editions of stock market compendia. Entries are individual bonds 
issues, grouped by countries and organized in two parts. The upper 
part of the panel includes securities that were in arrears at the end of 
the decade, while the bottom part of the panel has those that were 
56 Sutton, “Market Structure.” 
57 Michaely and Shaw, “Pricing.” 
58 Barings’ capital in the 1820s compares with that of Amsterdam’s leader, the House of 
Hope (0.5 million in 1810, then declining). The capital of the Hopes (see Buist, At Spes, pp. 
520–25) had been higher in the 1790s, precisely when the Amsterdam market was the main 
market for sovereign debt. 
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TABLE 2 
CAPITAL OF VARIOUS MERCHANT BANKS CIRCA 1825 
Bank
Date in 
London
(if applicable) 
 Capital  
(million £) 
1810s  1820s and Beyond 
Barings  1763  0.7–1.1 (1815–1816)  0.49 
Rothschilds 
Nathan (London) 
Amschel (Frankfort) 
Salomon (Vienna) 
Carl (Naples) 
James (Paris) 
 1805 
1805
Frankfort
Vienna
Naples
Paris
 1.8 
0.75 (1818) 
0.70 (1818) 
n.a.
n.a.
0.35 (1818) 
 4.37 
1.14 (1828) 
       0.8 (1828) 
       0.8 (1828) 
       0.8 (1828) 
       0.8 (1828) 
Frederick Huth & Co.  1808  n.a.         0.3 (1845) 
Antony Gibbs & Sons  1808     
Brown, Shipley & Co.  1810        0.12 (1815–1816)  0.35 (1825–1830) 
Frühling and Goschen  1814  n.a.  0.04 (1830) 
Glynn, Mills, and Co.  1753  n.a.  n.a. 
B. A. Goldschmidt  n.a.  n.a.  0.22 (1826) 
J. Henry Shröder & Co.  1818  n.a.  0.26 (1852) 
Liverpool Shröder firm  n.a.  n.a.  0.05 (1839) 
Lizardi and Co.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Wilson and Co.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Reid, Irving and Co.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Fletcher, Alexander and Co. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Sources: Barings: Ziegler, Sixth Great Power; Rothschilds: 1810s (Ferguson, World’s Banker,
p. 1039), and 1828: Gille, Rothschild, vol. I, p. 165; F. Huth: Chapman, Merchant Banking, p. 
40; Gibbs and Sons; Guildhall Library (MSS 11021-96, 11107-40, 11467-74, 16869-904, 
19862-89); B.A. Goldschmidt: from total liabilities at failure date (Gille, Rothschild, vol. I, p. 
159), assuming capital asset ratio similar to Rothschilds. Shröeder: Roberts, Shroders, p. 39 for 
Liverpool, and p. 527 for London—the two houses were independent from one another. 
consistently serviced during the 1820s (and beyond).59 For each bond 
issue, we identify the country and issue characteristics (date, amount, 
yield at issue); the participants in the issue process (contractor, issuer, 
and where the coupon was paid); and the status of the debt (whether it 
was in arrears or not).60
 Clearly, a great deal of careful selection was going on. The 
Rothschilds chased good securities and good securities only. No 
Rothschild loan was in arrears in 1829, and only three issues without 
59 This criterion is unaffected by the precise final date. Latin American debts remained in 
arrears until the early 1840s at the earliest, with occasional, short-lived, arrangements. 
60 Doubleday, Financial History, p. 281, has a similar table listing the issues of the 1820s 
along with underwriters’ names. It indicates with an asterisk the issues that were in arrears in 
1847. Although Doubleday does not draw any inference, one striking feature of the table is the 
special performance of Rothschild deals. Gilbart, Principles, p. 59, has a related table showing 
the London loan issues between 1818 and 1832 along with amounts and underwriters’ names.
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TABLE 3 
UNDERWRITERS AND DEFAULT: SOVEREIGN BOND ISSUES IN LONDON 
DURING THE 1820S 
Country Year  Contractor Issuer 
Payment  
of Coupon 
Amount
(million £)
Yield
at 
Issue
Status in 
Dec. 
1829
Defaulting States 
Buenos Aires 1824  
Carlson,
Catro and 
Robertson
Baring
Brothers
Baring
Brothers 1.0 7.1 
 Arrears 
since
01-1828
Chile 1822  
Hullett, 
Brothers
and Co. 
Hullett, 
Brothers
and Co. 
Hullett, 
Brothers
and Co. 
1.0 8.6 
 Arrears 
since
09-1826
Columbia 1822  
Herring,
Graham and 
Powles
Herring,
Graham and 
Powles
Herring,
Graham and 
Powles
2.0 7.1 
Arrears
since
05-1826
Columbia 1824  
B. A. 
Goldschmidt
B. A. 
Goldschmidt
B. A. 
Goldschmidt
4.75 6.8 
 Arrears 
since
01-1826
Greece 1824  
Loughnan,
Son, & 
Obrien’s
Loughnan,
Son, & 
Obrien’s
Loughnan,
Son, & 
Obrien’s
0.8 8.5 
 Arrears 
since
01-1827
Greece 1825  
J. & S. 
Ricardo 
J. & S. 
Ricardo 
J. & S. 
Ricardo 
2.0 8.8 
 Arrears 
since
 01-1827 
Guatemala 1825  
Barclay, 
Herring,
Richardson
& Co.,  
and J. A.  
Powles &  
Co.
Barclay, 
Herring,
Richardson
& Co.,  
and J. A.  
Powles & 
Co.
Barclay, 
Herring,
Richardson
& Co.,  
and J. A.  
Powles &
Co.
1.43 6.8 
Arrears
since
02-1828
Mexican 1824  
B. A. 
Goldschmidt
B. A. 
Goldschmidt 
B. A. 
Goldschmidt
3.2 8.6 
Arrears
since
10-1827
Mexican 1825  
Barclay, 
Herring,
Richardson
& Co., and 
J. A. Powles 
& Co. 
B. A. 
Goldschmidt 
& Co. 
B. A. 
Goldschmidt 
& Co. 
3.2 6.7 
Arrears
since
10-1827
Peru 1822  
Thomas
Kinder
Thomas
Kinder
Fry & 
Chapman
0.45 6.8 
Arrears
since
04-1826
Peru 1824  
Thomas
Kinder
Thomas
Kinder
Fry & 
Chapman
0.75 7.3 
Arrears
since
04-1826
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TABLE 3 — CONTINUED
Country Year  Contractor Issuer 
Payment  
of Coupon 
Amount
(million £)
Yield
at 
Issue
Status in 
Dec. 
1829
Defaulting States 
Peru 1825  
Thomas
Kinder
Thomas
Kinder
Fry & 
Chapman
0.62 7.7 
 Arrears 
since
04-1826
Portugal 1823  
B. A. 
Goldschmidt
B.A.
Goldschmidt
B.A.
Goldschmidt
1.5 5.7 
 Arrears 
since
06-1828
Spain
1821
to 1822 
Haldimand  
and Sons 
Haldimand 
and Sons 
Haldimand 
and Sons 
12.9 8.9 
 Arrears 
since
05-1824
Spain 1823  
James 
Campbell
James 
Campbell
James 
Campbell
1.4 16.7 
 Arrears 
since
05-1824
Non-Defaulting States 
Austria 1823  Rothschild Rothschild Rothschild 3.5 6.1 104.0 
Brazil 1824  
Bazett, 
Fletcher 
and
T. Wilson 
Bazett, 
Fletcher  
and
T. Wilson 
Thomas
Wilson and 
Co. 1.0 6.7 73.0 
Brazil 1825  Rothschild Rothschild Rothschild 2.0 5.9 73.0 
Denmark
1821
to 1822 
Haldimand  
and Sons 
Haldimand 
and Sons 
B.A.
Goldschmidt
3.0 6.5 
Fully 
redeemed
Denmark 1825  
Thomas
Wilson
and Co. 
Thomas
Wilson
and Co. 
Thomas
Wilson
and Co. 
3.5 4.0 75.1 
Naples 1824  Rothschild Rothschild Rothschild 2.5 5.4 98.5 
Prussia 1822  Rothschild Rothschild Rothschild 3.5 6.0 104.1 
Russia 1822  Rothschild Rothschild Rothschild 5.0 6.2 109.4 
Sources: Constructed by the authors from a large variety of archival and printed sources. We 
started with Fortune’s Epitome and Carey, Every Man, and then used stock exchange lists of 
London, Paris, and Vienna (Wetenhall, Course of Exchange, the Cours des effets commerçables 
à la Bourse de Paris and the Wiener Zeitung). We added evidence from primary sources 
(Rothschild Archive, the Baring Archive, etc.), plus material from Gille, Rothschild, vol. I; and 
Dawson, First Debt Crisis.
the Rothschild’s seal of approval escaped default: two for Denmark 
and one for Brazil. We have already suggested that, as a country with 
constitutional oversight of its financial process, Denmark did not 
need the Rothschild support badly, but we know that the Rothschilds 
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displayed an interest in issuing them.61 The same holds for Brazil.  As 
seen in Table 3, while the Rothschilds did not participate in the first 
issue, they were involved in the second one. 
 “Ordinary” firms such as B. A. Goldschmidt, Chapman and Fry, and 
Hulett Brothers could not be so choosy. They were happy to underwrite 
any bond that came their way, or which they could come across, and 
logically ended up with the defaulting ones. The only instance when a 
prestigious bank was associated with a default (Baring, with Buenos 
Aires), came when the bank had been a mere issuer, not an underwriter. 
The underwriter was a less prestigious firm, and Barings made it clear 
that they were not providing a seal of approval to the loan. 
 Table 4 provides a number of additional criteria to gauge the 
performance of the various issues. For each security, it reports: first, 
the issue “run-up,” which is the variation (in percentage) between issue 
price and the first quoted price—in other words, the percentage IPO 
discount; second, the short-term performance or result after three 
months; and third, the success or failure of the issue, where failure 
means not finding a market. Complete subscription does not necessarily 
mean success. Some securities were purchased in anticipation of a 
quick gain, but failed to find “buy and hold” investors when speculators 
began to sell.62 The result was a price collapse, and in some instances 
speculators who could not sell stopped paying instalments.63 We finally 
report a measure of long-term performance (average return) computed 
as the internal rate of return between the issue date and the end of the 
decade.64 Excess returns are measured relative to a risk-free British 
consol investment. 
 The table shows that securities underwritten and issued by the House 
of Rothschild clearly outperformed the rest. Rothschild’s issues had an 
average annual return ranging between 4.6 percent (Brazil 1825) and 
9.6 percent (Russia 1822), versus 3.3 percent to 5.4 percent on consols. 
That Brazil 1825 provides the lowest yield among Rothschild-sponsored 
issues may reflect the fact that the association between Brazil and  
Rothschilds was not complete. On the other hand, Brazil is the best 
61 Predictably, the Rothschilds were bidding for Denmark and Gille says their offer came at a 
hair-breadth from winning. 
62 Fodor, “Boom,” argues that the actual amounts collected from naive investors were tiny. 
63 See Fodor, “Boom,” p. 14, for Peru’s 1822 loan. A failed issue is identified as one where 
the quoted price stays below the issue price level in the three months following issue. 
64 The method is the same as described in Eichengreen and Portes, “Settling Defaults.” To 
abstract from the political events of the second half of 1830, the end of the decade is taken to be 
in December 1829. Other, longer horizons yield essentially identical results. When a security 
was converted during the period, we assumed that investors subscribed to the new security. 
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TABLE 4
PERFORMANCE OF SOVEREIGN LOANS IN LONDON DURING THE 1820S  
(in percent) 
Country Year 
Coupon
(%)
Run-Up
(%)
Short
Term: 
3-month
Placement
Result: 
Success/ 
Failure
Rate of 
Return
on Bond
Rate of 
Return
on
Consols
Excess
Return 
Defaulting States 
Buenos Aires 1824 6       1.47 –2.9 F –12.0 3.2 –15.2 
Chile 1822 6       9.82     18.57 S –6.5 5.9 –12.5 
Columbia 1822 6 0.3 –1.2 F –13.3 5.7 –19.0 
Columbia 1824 6 –2.0 –0.3 F –16.7 3.4 –20.1 
Greece 1824 5 4.6 –17.8 F –5.2 3.9 –8.6 
Greece 1825 5 1.3 –17.7 F –7.7 3.5 –11.1 
Guatemala 1825 5     –1.37 –9.6 F –28.5 5.0 –33.4 
Mexican 1824 5 6.9 14.7 S –10.8 4.1 –14.9 
Mexican 1825 6 3.6 0.8 S –18.1 3.6 –21.7 
Peru 1822 6 –8.2 –18.2 F –15.0 4.9 –20.0 
Peru 1824 6 –4.9 –31.7 F –20.1 3.3 –23.4 
Peru 1825 6 –5.7 –12.2 F –24.4 4.6 –29.0 
Portugal 1823 5 –0.3 0.0 S –3.8 5.1 –8.9 
Spain 1821–1822 5 2.2 21.9 S –21.2 5.5 –26.7 
Spain 1823 5 –10.7 –30.6 F –28.0 5.1 –33.1 
States Without Default 
Austria 1823 5       6.40 6.4 S 9.1 5.1 4.0 
Brazil 1824 5 2.0 3.7 F  6.5 3.0 3.6 
Brazil 1825 5       3.82 2.1 S 4.6 3.6 1.0 
Denmark 1821–1822 5       3.23 9.5 S 8.3 5.8 2.4 
Denmark 1825 3     –3.33 –4.7 F 5.4 3.4 2.0 
Naples 1821 5     12.50 15.0 S 7.8 5.7 2.1 
Naples 1824 5       0.67 1.8 S 6.9 3.3 7.1 
Prussia 1822 5       2.83 6.6 S 8.0 5.0 3.0 
Russia 1822 5       3.09 6.2 S 9.6 5.4 4.2 
Source : Authors’ computations from Wetenhall, Course of Exchange, and other sources.  
performing Latin American issue and the only Latin American issue 
with a Rothschild association. Losses on securities issued by ordinary 
banks were enormous. Guatemala held the record (a compounded 28.5 
percent annual loss), but all other securities faced dramatic negative 
returns—6.5 percent for Chile, 12 percent for Buenos Aires, and 15 
percent for Peru.
 We now show that the market understood this ex ante. First, we 
note from Table 3 that yields at issue were lowest for Rothschild 
bonds, which is consistent with purchasers considering the Rothschild’s 
underwriting to be a signal of future good performance. Further 
evidence of this understanding comes from the Rothschild issues. They 
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had typically positive run-ups and tended to be fully subscribed. By 
contrast, there were many failed issues among the securities sponsored 
by ordinary intermediaries. That Rothschilds were responsible, and not 
the “reputation” of borrowing states becomes clear if we look at the 
only two issues within the non-defaulting group that failed: the first 
Brazilian issue and second Danish one. It turns out—tellingly—that 
they were not sponsored by Rothschilds. If we compare this first 
Brazilian issue (issued by Wilson in 1824) with the second one (issued 
by Rothschilds in 1825), we see that Wilson’s ran up 2 percent and 
failed to sell out. Rothschilds ran up by 4 percent and was a success. 
Similarly, the Danish issue in 1825, which Rothschilds had tried to 
secure but which the Wilsons ultimately issued, experienced a 3.3 
percent decline on the first day of trading. We conclude that investors 
were careful about brands. Before purchasing, they looked at labels and, 
not finding what they cared for, put the stuff back on the shelves. 
 Another way to explore the performance of Rothschild and non-
Rothschild offerings is to examine the relationship between prices and 
short-term returns (Figure 4). The horizontal axis in Figure 4 reports the 
risk at the issue date measured by the yield at issue premium (this is the 
yield at issue minus the yield on British consols on the same date).65
The vertical axis measures short-term returns or “run-ups” over the 
issue price, which we measure as the percentage change between the 
issue price and the first quoted price. 
 Rothschild bonds, represented by triangles, are located along a 
line we fitted to capture the positive relation between risk and return. 
That is, short-term returns from Rothschild-sponsored deals were an 
increasing function of the risk that was revealed to the public by setting 
the issue price. The Rothschilds therefore did provide their clientele of 
investors with returns that were proportionate to the risks involved. 
Second, we see that Rothschild issues are located in the north-west part 
of the scatter plot. This means that for any level of initial risk, 
Rothschild issues outperform the others. When investors could predict 
the short-term run-up from a Rothschild issue, a non-Rothschild one 
was a lottery ticket. The existence of large, predictable gains, suggests 
some market imperfection: we argue that Rothschilds had monopoly 
power in high-quality issues. 
65 We are aware that issue prices are an imperfect indicator of market views. It is one of the 
reasons for our previous discussion of performance. Some contemporaries complained that 
spreads between good and bad securities were too small and failed to compensate investors for 
the risk. See, for example, Ziegler, Sixth Great Power, p. 102. 
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FIGURE 4
SHORT-TERM RISK AND RETURNS: THE ROTHSCHILD FRONTIER 
Note: Rothschild issues are represented by triangles, other issues with crosses.
Source: The authors’ computations. 
Bankers’ Commitment: A Case Study 
 A sponsoring bank had to work hard to secure stable and reliable 
returns for the securities it underwrote. There were all sorts of danger: 
liquidity shocks, rumors, unhappy competitors, and political rivals of 
the issuing governments, who could cry down securities. The bank 
might have to buy up shares, to keep trading going, which would 
require capital. That is what happened with Russia’s 1822 issue, which 
encountered difficulties, with “much stock staying unsold,” although on 
the face of it, it did well, with a typical “Rothschild run-up” of 3 
percent.66 Presumably, someone was buying, and that someone had to 
be the underwriters themselves. According to Gille, Rothschild pushed 
the price from 81 (the price at issue) to “84 and 85.”67 Prestigious 
66 Ziegler, Sixth Great Power, p. 94. See Corti, Reign, pp. 281–89, for a later incident when 
the Rothschilds cried down a Sardinian loan they had lost to Hambros. 
67 For the historical background and evidence of the Rothschilds’ fine tuning of their issue 
run-ups, see Gille, Rothschild, vol. I.
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underwriters could not just walk away from their sponsored deals, for 
their reputation was tied to the issues’ success. 
 An episode taking place abroad illustrates what was going on. In 
1821 new Neapolitan securities were introduced by the House of 
Rothschild in Paris with cross listing in London.68 The new security was 
issued in three batches: the first, in May 1821; the second, in December 
1821; the two issues of 1821 had been major successes, with prices 
rising continuously. The third contract, signed August 1822, was a 
forward underwriting agreement. It stated that the issue would occur in 
two tranches that would be sold at 73 and 75 in January 1823 and 
January 1824 respectively. An extrapolation of price trends (shown in 
Figure 5) suggests that Rothschilds were likely betting on further price 
increases. But the loan was disturbed by the events in Spain in late 
1822. On the day the issue was supposed to take place, the price of the 
rentes was below the level at which new securities were to be sold. The 
Rothschilds ended up becoming sole purchasers, and the bond was 
not formally introduced in the market.69 At the same time, Rothschilds 
were intervening to support the securities, probably through forward 
purchases. There is a suggestion that they did so in partnership with 
Naples’ finance minister.70 By January 1824 prices had recovered and 
the issue could finally be unloaded. 
 Problems were renewed with the collapse of Latin American 
securities, which took their toll on Neapolitan bonds. There was a risk 
of contagion. Investors sold Neapolitan bonds, forcing the Rothschilds 
to step in again. The 1826 balance sheet of the Paris branch (dated  
June 1826) shows Neapolitan bonds representing 15 percent of assets. 
That amounted to one-fifth of the 1824 London issue and was an 
amount comparable to Barings’ capital.71 James de Rothschild wrote to 
Charles in Vienna that if it “had not been for their efforts,” Neapolitan 
funds would be trading much lower and perhaps “the discredit 
could have been complete.”72 We conclude that out of concern 
68 In what follows, we use quotations for the so-called “Falconet debts,” which evidence 
suggests was used as benchmark for settling transaction on other instruments. Data (available 
upon request) show that quotations on Falconet debts were consistent with other sterling or 
franc denominated Neapolitan rentes when they are both available.  
69 From Great Britain Parliament, Select Committee, p. 267, “Some Revolution took place,
[. . .] and if it had not been that my grandfather had paid the installment and kept the stock, the 
government would never have got their money.” 
70 Gille, Rothschild, vol. I., p. 97. 
71 The asset side was £3.8 million of which £0.5 million was Neapolitan bonds. Gille, 
Rothschild, vol. I, pp. 164–65. 
72 Idem. In October 1827 Rothschild offered to buy future coupons at par, in effect selling 
cheap insurance against default, see Gille, Rothschild, vol. I., p. 168. There was also diplomatic 
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FIGURE 5
SPOT PRICES OF NEAPOLITAN RENTES IN LONDON 1821–1824 
TRENDS AND ISSUE PRICES 
Sources: Wetenhall, Course of Exchange; and Cours des effets commerçables à la Bourse de 
Paris.
for their reputation, prestigious underwriters offered extensive post-issue 
insurance services that were only feasible because of their enormous 
capital.73
An Equilibrium for Intermediaries, Investors, and Borrowers 
 Clearly, intermediaries, investors, and borrowers found rewards in this 
system. Consider first the banks, for which we have gathered evidence for 
the period 1822–1840. Good banks, we argue, had all reasons to be careful 
regarding the instruments they would bring to the market after the collapse 
of 1825. The Rothschilds’ careful selection and Barings’ wait and see 
maneuvering: Naples was financing military occupation by Austria, and the Vienna branch was 
trying to persuade Metternich to put an end to the occupation in order to alleviate Naples’ 
financial burden.  
73 Gille, Rothschild, vol. I., p. 163, emphasizes the importance of liquidity. Gille, Rothschild, 
vol. I., p. 165, also describes how the Rothschilds clustered various layers of investors according 
to their appetite for risk and could involve clients at various stages as needed. 
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enabled both to remain in the market consistently. Other banks, by 
contrast, cashed fees for those securities they managed to sell and then 
often dropped out. Of the ten banks (besides Rothschilds and Barings) that 
were involved in the foreign debt boom of 1822–1825, we find that two 
went bust and six withdrew during the subsequent period (1826–1840). 
Finally, three houses entered the sovereign debt market for the first time 
after 1826. Such “wildcats” underwriters came and went.74
 What about investors? During the 1820s investing a prestigious 
underwriter meant huge gains. Earlier historians have emphasized that 
Rothschilds managed the portfolios of the super rich of the day. The 
Rothschilds’ investments resembled the so-called “convergence plays” 
that modern investment banks undertook on emerging markets sovereign 
debt instruments in the first half of the current decade, and like these, they 
were very profitable. The run-ups of Rothschild IPOs rewarded the  
bank’s inner circle of investors handsomely. They bought the Neapolitan 
“rescue” of 1823 at 73, and could sell it five months later at 76.25, a 9 
percent annualized return.75 The Rothschilds’ operations may be said to 
have pioneered the actions of modern hedge funds with their sheer size 
and ambitious bets. Capital, again, mattered. 
 What about borrowers? Large Rothschild run-ups amounted to money 
left on the table, so governments were probably not too happy. But they 
had no alternative. Using other houses would mean a bad signal to the 
market and a risk of failure. Furthermore, as Figure 6 shows, these costs 
diminished over time. Having successfully brought a new borrower to the 
market, the Rothschilds now had to take lower margins, for they had 
revealed the issuer’s worth and thus eroded their own monopoly power. 
Of course, they still did retain a lead that enabled them to defeat 
competitors in open auctions, because the signals sent by their competitors 
were not as good as the ones they could send.  
 The result was an incentive system that shifted rewards from good 
behavior to the future while imposing short-term costs; it can be 
interpreted as a mechanism that encouraged borrowers to reveal their true 
worth. In a period of market euphoria, when liquidity was abundant, a 
non-serious borrower would be deterred by the high access costs charged 
74 The two banks that managed to remain in the sovereign debt business past 1825 were the 
Wilsons and Ricardo. None of Wilson’s earlier issues had defaulted and so its continued 
participation is understandable. Ricardo, the underwriter with the highest yield at issue before 
1825 (about 600 basis points), managed to introduce several loans during the second period, 
again at discount prices (above 600 basis points). Ricardo was an avowed seller of junk bonds. 
It is a form of honesty. 
75 Another case for which we could compute gains is the Brazilian rescue operation of May 
1829, where the Rothschilds let the Wilsons act as underwriters and issuers but took over most 
of the subscription. If the securities were sold in December at the market price and held, 
investors would gain above 40 percent. 
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FIGURE 6
PRICE RUN-UPS IN MAIDEN AND SEASONED ISSUES, NAPLES AND PRUSSIA 
Note: Neapolitan forward contracts discussed earlier are excluded from this chart for obvious 
reasons.
Source: The authors’ computations. 
by a prestigious firm like Rothschilds. Such a borrower would prefer to go 
to another, less prestigious bank, which would sell at a lower run-up and 
higher price. By contrast, employing the Rothschilds meant heavy up-
front costs but also long-run benefits. 
 The 1823 Portuguese loan is illuminating here. The Rothschilds 
approached the government of Portugal and made an offer and so did B. 
A. Goldschmidt. According to the contracts however, Rothschilds’ IPO 
price was almost 20 percent lower than that offered by the House of 
Goldschmidt, which eventually won the deal.76 Using the fitted relation 
between the spread at issue and the IPO run ups in Figure 4, we can 
predict that Rothschilds’ issue would have had a 6 percent run-up (Figure 
7): Portuguese bonds would have risen to 77.75 (or a yield of 6.5 percent) 
on the first day of trading. That is much lower than Goldschmidt’s  
price, which suggests that the higher issue price set by the House of 
Goldschmidt was not sustainable. Predictably, Goldschmidt had to push 
76 That is, Rothschild offered to issue at 73; Rothschild Archive 000/401 A. There was also a 
commission of 3 percent. B. A. Goldschmidt brought the issue at 87. We do not know the 
Goldschmidt commission. 
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FIGURE 7 
A COUNTERFACTUAL: PORTUGAL 1823 
Source: Authors’ computations from Wetenhall, Course of Exchange; and Rothschild Archive. 
the price up through heavy market purchases, thus going long on 
Portuguese bonds. When the general decline began, it was caught wrong 
footed, and that contributed to the bank’s downfall in February 1826. At 
that date, Portugal traded at 73, which was ironically Rothschild’s IPO 
price. Portugal’s decline continued beyond that point until it eventually 
defaulted. It is likely that a good borrower with a longer time horizon 
would have accepted Rothschild’s apparently stricter offer—and would 
also later have enjoyed market support and sustained market access. 
UNDERWRITERS, INFORMATION, AND CONTAGION: A TEST
 And thus it is that bonds issued by Rothschilds were successes while 
bonds issued by ordinary houses were failures. Rothschild securities 
became a brand. In effect, a transfer of reputation from the intermediary 
to the borrower had occurred. Austrian Ambassador Charles Louis de 
Ficquelmont reported to Metternich in February 1822 on the causes of the 
surge of Neapolitan bond prices: “And thus it is that the credit of a 
foreigner, which is to say that of the House of Rothschild, not that of 
the Kingdom of Naples, was responsible for the rise of Neapolitan 
Risk: Spread at Issue over Secondary Price of Consols (in percentage points) 
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securities . . . .”77 Popular stock market sources such as is reproduced in 
Figure 3 therefore contained the right amount of information: they said 
that Goldschmidt had underwritten Portugal, while Rothschild had 
underwritten Naples, and that was enough for investors. The underwriter 
was the fundamental. 
 Contemporaries recognized that, and information on prestigious 
banks’ actions became a market driver.78 People trading on volatility 
remarked that the number of messengers received by the House of 
Rothschild was a signal of impeding market movements. In Frankfurt, a 
“mini-crash” was triggered in April 1822 by the arrival of an unusual 
number of Rothschilds’ couriers.79 In Naples, messengers had to change 
clothing to avoid disrupting the market. Speculators tried to plant 
rumors about the Rothschilds, which they denied, clarified, or ignored. 
A whole business of information collection, retention, and distribution 
was born, and its focal point was not what the borrowers were doing but 
the actions of intermediaries.  
 These considerations provide a motivation for a final test of the views 
articulated in this article. We have seen that there were essentially two 
types of intermediaries: “value rich” intermediaries, who signaled 
investment grade (essentially Rothschilds, since Barings abstained), and 
“value poor” intermediaries, who signaled a junk bond. If our view 
is correct, then we should observe certain patterns of co-movement 
among bonds spreads in the two groups. The spreads of countries’ 
bonds underwritten by ordinary (value poor) banks should be strongly 
correlated with one another, but weakly correlated with the spreads of 
bonds underwritten by prestigious (value rich) ones. We also expect less 
co-movement among bonds underwritten by prestigious banks, since 
prestigious underwriters are able to signal finer quality shades. The test 
we consider looks at empirical data to see whether these predictions 
are borne out, distinguishing between Rothschild countries and non-
Rothschild ones. 
 There are various ways to measure co-movements. For simplicity, 
(and while we realize this method has limitations) this section 
adopts the methodology in P. Mauro, N. Sussman, and Y. Yafeh, which 
focuses on commonality of extreme events or “sharp changes” in bond 
77 Gille, Rothschild, vol. I., p. 98 
78 This interpretation is consistent with Gille, Rothschild, vol. I., p. 166; Moniteur universel
22 September 1826; and Journal du Commerce, 23 September 1826. 
79 Gille (Rothschild, vol. I., p. 188); and Journal du Commerce (3 April 1822). See also 
Gille (Rothschild, vol. I., p. 167). 
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TABLE 5 
SHARP CHANGES WITHIN DIFFERENT GROUPS OF BORROWERS  
(1822–1829)
Periods Non-Rothschild Group Rothschild Group 
 Sharp Changes Within and Between Groups 
 200 basis 
points
  20% 200 basis 
points
  20% 
 Within Non-Rothschild Within Rothschild 
Sharp changes in percent of total 
observations 
10.5 7.6 0.0 2.5 
 Proportion of Months with Characteristics Listed 
No sharp changes 37.2 45.7 100.0 90.4 
Sharp changes in exactly one 
country 
20.2 25.5 0.0 8.5 
Sharp changes in exactly two 
countries
16.0 11.7 0.0 0.0 
Sharp changes in three countries  
or more 
26.6 8.5 0.0 1.1 
 Contagion Ratio 
Number of sharp changes in more 
than one country to number of 
sharp changes in at least one 
country 
67.8 44.2 n.a.* 11.1 
* When there are no sharp changes to begin with, the contagion ratio is meaningless. 
Note: In order to identify common sharp changes, individual series must be complete and cover 
the same time period. As a result, Rothschild countries are Russia, Prussia, and Naples. Non-
Rothschild countries are Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Spain.  
Source: Authors’ computations using Wetenhall, Course of Exchange.
spreads. Sharp changes are defined as monthly variations of more than 
200 basis points (say, an increase from 9 to 11 percent) or, alternatively, 
more than 20 percent (say an increase from 9 to 10.8 percent). Common 
sharp changes in the spreads of different countries’ bonds imply that a 
common “contagious” factor is at work. We apply this framework to 
determine whether there was contagion and what its source was during 
the period 1822–1829.  
 Table 5 shows that sharp changes were much more frequent for 
non-Rothschild countries than for Rothschild countries. Second, we see 
that contagion tended to cluster in the non-Rothschild group. The 
contagion ratio (the ratio of sharp changes in more than one country to 
sharp changes in at least one country) is very high for the non-
Rothschild group, but very low for the Rothschild group (in fact, it 
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cannot be computed for the 200 basis points in the Rothschild group for 
sheer lack of such events). 
 We then computed (but did not report in Table 5) the conditional 
probability of at least one sharp change occurring in the Rothschild 
group conditional on a sharp change occurring in the non-Rothschild 
group. In the only case for which it can be meaningfully computed (the 
20 percent variation case), this probability is 13.9 percent. This stands 
against the non-conditional probability of a sharp change in the 
Rothschild group, which Table 5 gives as 9.6 percent (= 100 – 90.4). A 
sharp change in a non-Rothschild bond spread did increase the 
probability of Rothschild countries’ sharp changes, but the infection 
was limited. 
 Our interpretation of these results is that when investors observed 
an event affecting a country underwritten by an ordinary intermediary, 
they thought that it was relevant for other countries underwritten by 
other ordinary intermediaries, but not for countries underwritten by 
Rothschilds. There are two possible reasons for this way of thinking. 
Either investors expected prestigious banks to sell prime securities, 
so that they could ignore information coming from the market for 
ordinary government debt. Alternatively, they expected these banks 
to intervene in the open market in support of their customers (as we 
have seen was the case for Naples). The Rothschild brand was thus both 
insurance against sharp price changes and a sorting device that enabled 
countries—with or without a parliament—to avoid contagion. That 
possibility could not have escaped the attention of Metternich, architect 
of the Holy Alliance. 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND DEMOCRATIC ADVANTAGE 
 Our article has dealt with the development of a sustainable market 
for sovereign debt in the early nineteenth century. It revolves around 
a simple idea. The system rested on a transfer of credibility from  
the underwriter to the borrower. Investors could not learn about 
borrowers, but they could learn about underwriters. Prestigious 
underwriters came to monopolize the market for good sovereign debt. 
Lower quality intermediaries tried and did occasionally break in but 
their involvement signalled higher risks. Investors got the message,  
and the market for bad debt collapsed and did not resume for a  
while. We conclude that hierarchy among intermediaries offered a 
remedy against what theoreticians call the “contracting” and “collective 
action” externalities in sovereign debt. The early-nineteenth-century 
international financial architecture provides a fascinating case of how 
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“governance without government” may look. It rested on an intriguing 
form of market conditionality made possible by the monopoly power of 
leading underwriters.80
 Our analysis has implications for future research. One is that 
fiscal checks and balances can be found in places other than domestic 
political institutions. We recognize that it is sometimes possible to 
monitor government satisfactorily by giving parliament a veto point 
over the executive. We also realize that this may be desirable. But other 
monitoring devices exist, and the quality of financial intermediaries 
provides an example. 
 What then was needed for sovereign borrowing to occur? From 
our perspective, the answer is this: adequate borrowers were not 
necessarily those with constitutions and commitments. Those who could 
implement the policy adjustments that monopolist underwriters would 
require were also eligible.81
 This line of reasoning suggests that the quality of the administrative 
apparatus and centralization of decision making were critical elements 
for access to external funding. From the vantage point of administrative 
robustness and centralized decision making, Brazil, the Kingdom of 
Naples, Prussia, Austria, and Russia all had something in common: 
they were not all parliamentary countries, but they were all described as 
strong, centralized states. 
 The development of sovereign lending in the nineteenth century  
was collateralized by robust administrative infrastructures. Strong 
and reactionary governments were allowed to borrow, even if they 
lacked domestic constitutional constraints, precisely because they 
were strong. There was no bias in favor of borrowers who were 
democratic or supported the rule of law. But there was a bias in favor of 
arch-conservatives who had no remorse about implementing unpopular 
policies or even ruthless repression. This somewhat frightening 
conclusion is antithetic to the “democratic advantage” view, which 
neo-institutionalists have recently emphasized.82
80 Rosenau, Governance.
81 We do not think of our new hypothesis as necessarily exclusive to that of North and 
Weingast. The case of Denmark is a reminder. 
82 Schultz and Weingast, “Democratic Advantage.” 
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